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2018 STUART ROME LECTURE: 
ORIGINS OF AND POTENTIAL 
SOLUTIONS TO HIGH PRESCRIPTION 
DRUG PRICES IN THE U.S. 
AARON S. KESSELHEIM, M.D., J.D., M.P.H. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Prescription drug prices are one of the fastest rising health care costs, 
becoming an increasing burden for patients and our health care system. The 
essential policy dilemma is that while drugs are among the most cost-effective 
interventions in medicine and the drug industry plays an important role in 
bringing these products forward—a process that can require substantial 
resources—increasing drug prices in the U.S. can make important breakthroughs 
unaffordable to many of our patients. Since high drug prices can lead to poor 
clinical consequences and have become a major driver in U.S. health care 
spending, this review is intended to provide an overall landscape of U.S. 
prescription drug spending, to address widely discussed explanations for high 
drug prices, and finally to review some proposed interventions and policy 
solutions.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Prescription drug spending in the U.S. rose 12% in 2015 and another 6% in 
2016.1 Total drug spending in 2016 was $450 billion, which accounted for about 
22% of health care spending, 19% of Medicare spending, and 19% of employer-
based insurance benefits.2  Some health insurance companies have reported that 
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 1. IQVIA INST. FOR HUMAN DATA SCI., MEDICINES USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW OF 
2016 AND OUTLOOK TO 2021 6 (2017). 
 2. See IQVIA INST. FOR HUMAN DATA SCI., MEDICINES USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW 
OF 2016 AND OUTLOOK TO 2021 6 (2017); https://www.iqvia.com/institute/reports/medicines-use-and-
spending-in-the-us-a-review-of-2016 (describing total drug and health care spending in the United States); 
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drugs now account for one of every four dollars they spend on health care.3 U.S. 
drug prices and spending far exceed those of other similar industrialized 
countries around the world. For example, countries like Canada, Germany, 
France, and Australia, all of which have excellent health care systems, on average 
spend about $400 per capita compared to the $850 the U.S. spends per capita on 
prescription drugs.4 The main driver of prescription drug spending is brand-name 
drugs, which make up only about 10% of prescriptions but three-quarters of drug 
spending.5 Prescription drug prices overall have been increasing substantially 
over the last decade. There was a 208% increase in prices of the most commonly 
used brand-name drugs from 2008 to 2016, a 12% increase in the Consumer Price 
Index, and a 28% increase in aggregate health care spending.6 
This is not a new phenomenon, as one study found that brand-name cancer 
drug launch prices have been rising exponentially over the last 50 years.7 But in 
recent years, we have seen that increases in drug prices are also not limited to 
brand-name products. In 2015, Turing Pharmaceuticals raised the price of 
pyrimethamine (Daraprim), a decades-old drug for patients with an infection that 
can sometimes arise among patients with reduced immune systems such as end-
stage HIV infection, from $13.50 to $750 a pill.8 Overall, generic drugs are still 
extremely inexpensive and among the most economical products in the U.S. 
 
MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE HEALTH 
CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 109 (2016), http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/june-2016-
report-to-the-congress-medicare-and-the-health-care-delivery-system.pdf?sfvrsn=0 (describing 
breakdown of Medicare spending in the U.S.); see also Drew Altman, Prescription Drugs’ Sizable Share 
of Health Spending, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Dec. 13, 2015), https://www.kff.org/health-
costs/perspective/prescription-drugs-sizable-share-of-health-spending/; Drew Altman, Prescription 
Drugs’ Sizable Share of Health Spending, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2015), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/12/13/prescription-drugs-sizable-share-of-health-spending/ 
(explaining health care spending for employer-based insurance benefits). 
 3. Michael Sherman et al., Prescription Medicines Account for One in Four Dollars Spent by a  
Commercial Health Plan, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 24 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180821.820628/full/. 
 4. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins 
and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 859 (2016). 
 5. Id. at 860. 
 6. EXPRESS SCRIPTS, 2016 DRUG TREND REPORT 31 (2017) (providing a graph that depicts the 
208% increase); Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: 
Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 860 (2016) (describing a nationwide hike in the price 
index of prescription medications). 
 7. Peter B. Bach, Monthly and Median Costs of Cancer Drugs at the Time of FDA Approval, 1965-
2015, MEMORIAL SLOAN KETTERING CANCER CENT., https://www.mskcc.org/research-programs/health-
policy-outcomes/cost-drugs (last visited Nov. 9, 2018).  
 8. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-
raises-protests.html.  
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health care system. However, there are parts of the generic market that do not 
work efficiently, leading to price hikes. 
The clinical consequences of increasing drug prices are well-documented. 
Studies have found that patients who were prescribed a costly brand name 
product rather than a more affordable generic alternative adhered less well to 
treatment and, as a result, had worse health outcomes.9,10 High prices are directly 
felt by the millions of patients without prescription drug insurance, as well as by 
patients with insurance via out-of-pocket costs. With rising prices leading to 
increased insurance premiums, some insurers have implemented cost-
containment strategies that have transferred more drug expenses onto patients’ 
shoulders through deductibles and co-payments.11 Medicaid programs, which do 
not charge co-payments or substantial cost-sharing, have had to cut back on other 
services and tighten eligibility requirements due to expanding prescription drug 
budgets.12 According to a survey in 2016, about one in every five patients 
reported that they, or another family member did not fill a prescription in the last 
year due to costs.13  
III. EXPLANATIONS FOR HIGH DRUG PRICES 
Many reasons have been offered for why prescription drug prices have risen 
so substantially in recent years. Some contend that these high prices are 
connected to innovation in the field. Naturally, since brand-name drug 
companies are involved in the development and testing of the investigational 
drugs that are submitted to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), approved, 
and then marketed, they play a major role in the innovation pathway and receive 
much of the revenue that comes from these high prices. However, it is also 
important to recognize the limitations of the claims that link high drug prices to 
innovation. Many of the most transformative drugs that have come through in 
the past few decades originated in publicly funded research, supported by the 
National Institutes of Health and performed in academic medical centers.14 This 
 
 9. William H. Shrank et al., The Implications of Choice: Prescribing Generic or Preferred 
Pharmaceuticals Improves Medication Adherence for Chronic Conditions, 166 ARCH INTERN MED. 332, 
332–35 (2006).  
 10. Joshua J. Gagne et al., Comparative Effectiveness of Generic and Brand-Name Statins on Patient 
Outcomes: A Cohort Study, 161 ANN INTERN MED. 400, 405 (2014).  
 11. Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, ‘Government Patent Use’: A Legal Approach to 
Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 791, 791–93 (2016). 
 12. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States Origins 
and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 864 (2016). 
 13. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: HEALTH CARE 
PRIORITIES FOR 2017 22 (2016),  http://files.kff.org/attachment/Topline-Kaiser-Health-TrackingPoll-
Health-Care-Priorities-for-2017. 
 14. Aaron Kesselheim et al., The Roles of Academia, Rare Diseases, and Repurposing in the 
Development of the Most Transformative Drugs, 34 HEALTH AFF. 286, 287, 291 (2015). 
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work makes drug identification possible by uncovering the key science and 
translational discoveries that make drug identification possible. In some cases, 
scientists have been integrally involved in developing the products themselves; 
developing monoclonal antibodies or taking drug samples through a proof of 
concept testing before drug manufacturers get involved as a partner to help 
finance and organize later-stage clinical trials. Large drug manufacturers spend 
about 13 to 20% of their revenues on research and development.15 By contrast, 
they spend 31% on sales, marketing and administration.16 One review estimated 
that much of the direct investment in research by large drug manufacturers is 
directed towards already-approved products, with approximately 2.2% being 
invested in research that could lead to future transformative discoveries.17  
Another common justification for high drug prices is that they derive from 
high pre-approval clinical testing requirements. However, over the past few 
decades, it has been increasingly easier to meet the FDA standards of efficacy 
and safety for new drug approval. In the recent decade, about a third of all new 
drugs are approved on the basis of a single pivotal trial. Two-thirds of drugs are 
approved based on data from pivotal trials lasting six months or shorter, even if 
the drugs are chronic disease medications intended to be taken by patients for 
much longer.18 Half of all drugs are approved based on effects observed in 
surrogate measures as opposed to actual clinical endpoints.19 Surrogate measures 
are laboratory tests or other physical measurements that are easier to measure 
and often occur before a clinical event may be expected. Drugs approved in 
recent years are tested on average in fewer than one thousand patients in their 
pivotal clinical trials.20  
Furthermore, the FDA has a number of expedited development or approval 
pathways for drugs that are particularly important, meet an unmet medical need, 
or treat a serious or life-threatening condition. For example, drugs given a 
Priority Review designation must be reviewed within six months, as compared 
to the standard ten-month review period. In 2012, the Breakthrough Therapy 
designation was created to move drugs through pre-approval testing as quickly 
as possible. In recent years, about three-quarters of all newly approved drugs 
 
 15. Jerry Avorn, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, & COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
205 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 2004).  
 16. Id.; Aaron S. Kesselheim, et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: 
Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA, 858, 863 (2016).  
 17. Donald W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Foreign Free Riders and the High Price of US Medicines. 331 
BMJ  958, 959 (2005). 
 18. Nicholas S. Downing, et. al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA Approval of Novel 
Therapeutic Agents, 2005-2012, 311 JAMA, 368, 369–72 (2015). 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id.  
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qualified for one or more of these special pathways.21 Studies have found that 
drugs in these pathways on average offer more quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs) than non-expedited drugs.22 However, it is also the case that less-
innovative second- and later-line drugs in a class are qualifying for one of these 
pathways.23 
These trends have made the FDA the fastest regulatory agency in the world 
in terms of new drug approvals. The FDA’s new oncology drug approval review 
times were found on average to be shorter than European Medicines Agency 
review times. Novel therapeutics are now more likely to be approved in the U.S. 
before being marketed in Europe or Canada.24 In recent years, nearly all 
approved drugs are now being approved on the first cycle of review, illustrating 
the FDA’s modern-day efficiency.25 
Are drugs expensive simply because they impart good clinical value?  The 
Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) regularly conducts formal 
value-based assessments of drugs, evaluates how effectively the drugs work, and 
what the prices of alternative products are in order to determine whether the drug 
is priced at a level that is reasonably consistent with its value.26 ICER’s 
assessments have shown that while some expensive drugs are priced in line with 
value, many are priced at levels much greater than their estimated value.27 
The underlying reason for high drug prices is the U.S. allows 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to charge whatever the market will bear. Indeed, 
rather than being driven by innovation or FDA requirements, many 
pharmaceutical manufacturers admit that prices are set based on what others are 
setting; a commonly stated justification for high prices is that the prices of their 
 
 21. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., The FDA Breakthrough-Drug Designation- Four Years of  
Experience, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1444, 1445 (2018). 
 22. James D. Chambers et al., Drugs Cleared Through the FDA’s Expedited Review Offer Greater 
Gains Than Drugs Approved by Conventional Process, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1408, 1408–14 (2017).  
 23. Aaron Kesselheim et al., Trends in Utilization of FDA Expedited Drug Development and 
Approval Programs, 1987-2014: Cohort Study, BMJ, Aug. 17, 2015, at 5. 
 24. Nicholas S. Downing et al., Regulatory Review of Novel Therapeutics—Comparison of Three 
Regulatory Agencies, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2284, 2290–91 (2012). 
 25. John K. Jenkins, Director, Office of New Drugs, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 
CDER New Drug Review: 2015 Update at the FDA/CMS Summit (Dec. 14, 2015), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDE
R/UCM477020.pdf.  
 26. See generally, INST. FOR CLINICAL AND ECON. REV., https://icer-review.org/about/ (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2018). 
 27. Id.; Peter B. Bach & Steven D. Pearson, Payer & Policy Maker Steps to Support Value–Based 
Pricing for Drugs, 314 JAMA 2503, (2015) (discussing a review by ICER of 2 inhibitor drugs for high 
cholesterol showing that a reasonable value–based price range of the long–term clinical benefits would be 
lower than the annual price list). 
  
6 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 22:1 
 
drugs are in line with other therapies or treatments.28   Exacerbating this problem 
are strategies that undercut competition and hinder payors’ abilities to provide 
counterweights that might reduce high prices; that is, the market will bear 
excessive prices well out of proportion to the value that new drugs provide 
because it is highly inefficient. In the next section, I will review how changes to 
make competition more effective are among the most promising strategies for 
bringing prices down to more reasonable levels. 
IV. ADDRESSING HIGH DRUG PRICES IN THE U.S. MARKET 
Addressing inappropriately high drug prices requires different approaches 
to each segment of a drug’s development course. After the pre-approval period—
since drug prices are not strongly associated with the cost of drug development—
the next three major time segments are the brand-name market exclusivity 
period, the transition to generic competition, and the multisource market.  
Interventions in these areas may affect drug prices, and I will review them in 
turn.  
A. Brand-Name Market Exclusivity Period 
When the FDA approves a new drug, the law guarantees at least about six 
to seven years of market exclusivity, during which time the FDA will not approve 
any direct competitors, allowing manufacturers to establish prices.29 There are 
some variations to the length of market exclusivity depending on the product 
type. For example, certain antibiotics get an additional 5 years, and biologics get 
twelve years.30 In addition to this guaranteed minimum period of market 
exclusivity, brand-name drugs are protected by patents that last twenty years.31 
The first patent on the underlying active ingredient is obtained around the time 
the active ingredient is synthesized or discovered, and therefore a certain amount 
of time remaining on it has usually expired by the time the drug reaches the 
market. (This time is offset by patent term restoration that adds back to the patent 
 
 28. Aimee Picchi, The Cost of Biogen’s New Drug: $750,000 Per Patient, CBS NEWS MONEYWATCH 
(Dec. 29, 2009, 2:00 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-cost-of-biogens-new-drug-spinraza-
750000-per-patient/ (noting that a pharmaceutical company claimed that a $750,000 price tag on a rare 
disease drug is consistent with other therapies for rare diseases); Courtney Hutchison, Provenge Cancer 
Vaccine: Can You Put a Price on Delaying Death?, ABC NEWS (July 29, 2010), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/ProstateCancerNews/provenge-cancer-vaccine-months-life-worth-
100k/story?id=11269159; Judy Silber, Onyx Gets OK for Kidney Cancer Drug, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, 
Dec. 21, 2005, at F4; Amy Dockser Marcus, Price Becomes Factor in Cancer Treatment, WALL ST.  J., 
Sept. 7, 2004, at D.1. 
 29. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2016).  
 30. 21 U.S.C. § 355f(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2010). 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2015). 
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the time of FDA review and half the time of clinical development.)32 One study 
found that on average new drugs get about 12 to 14 years of competition-free 
exclusivity, while first-in-class drugs—often the most innovative products—get 
on average about 14 to 15 years.33 
During the market exclusivity period, there are important limits placed on 
public and private payors that prevent them from negotiating effectively with 
manufacturers. For example, Medicare, the government insurance program for 
patients over age 65, covers about 45 million people and accounts for about a 
third of the nation’s drug expenditure, but it does not use a national formulary or 
negotiate drug prices on behalf of the individual Medicare Part D plans that 
provide outpatient drug benefits to enrollees.34 There are also six protected drug 
classes for which Medicare Part D plans have to cover all approved drugs, such 
as drugs for cancer and mental illness. Although Part D plans can use formulary 
management tools such as prior authorization, this rule undermines effective 
price negotiation, since it is hard to negotiate an effective price if a Part D insurer 
is forced by the federal govt to cover the drug, even if it is no better than one or 
two or three similar products. Similarly, Medicaid, the federal- and state-based 
insurance program for poor patients that covers about 75 million people, cannot 
exclude most FDA-approved drugs from its formulary (it, too, can use formulary 
management tools).35 As a result, while Medicaid is guaranteed a certain best 
price based on what the drugs are sold for in the private market, states are often 
unable to negotiate additional savings. Among the federal government payors, 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has the most flexibility in terms of 
setting its formulary and in negotiating on behalf of all its enrollees around the 
country. As a result, the VA often pays far less for many drugs. 
Private payors also have limitations on their abilities to negotiate prices. 
One of the primary limitations is the lack of comparative effectiveness 
information at the time of approval, which documents how effectively drugs 
work compared to other drug or non-drug treatments on the market. In a sample 
of 197 drugs approved in years 2000-2010, only half of the drugs had 
comparative effectiveness information at the time of approval.36 Comparative 
effectiveness information does not reliably emerge after approval either, since 
there is no system for reliably generating such evidence. Formulary management 
 
 32. 35 U.S.C. §156(c) (2012). 
 33. Bo Wang et al., Research Letter: Variation in Time of Market Exclusivity among Top-Selling 
Prescription Drugs in the United States, 175 JAMA 635, 636 (2015). 
 34. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins  
and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 862 (2016). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Nikolas H. Goldberg et al., Availability of Comparative Efficacy Data at the Time of Drug  
Approval in the United States, 305 JAMA 1786, 1787 (2011). 
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tools used by private insurers can also be undermined by manufacturers; for 
example, as part of their promotional outreach, manufacturers have offered 
coupons to patients that counteract increased cost-sharing levels or provided 
physician offices with strategies to circumvent prior authorization paperwork. In 
addition, some state laws require private payors to cover drugs, making it 
difficult for payors to negotiate a reasonable price. For example, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures conducted a study reviewing state laws and 
found that about two-thirds of states required private payors to cover off-label 
uses of cancer drugs.37  
Possible solutions for improving competitive price negotiation during the 
market exclusivity period include giving public payors greater latitude to use 
formularies or tools like therapeutic substitution, which would allow these 
payors to more efficiently direct patients to equally effective therapies that may 
cost less. When implemented in an evidence-based and transparent way, 
formulary tools may be useful in helping to provide greater leverage in the 
negotiating process with the manufacturer. Authorizing Medicare to negotiate 
prices for drugs has been widely suggested as an alternative solution that could 
be accomplished by changing a specific part of the Medicare Part D statute. 
However, economists have found that authorizing Medicare to negotiate drug 
prices will likely lead to small savings without broader formulary oversight, 
which can be included as part of that legislative change.38 
In the private market, accountable care organizations are starting to emerge 
that provide the opportunity to pair health services and drug costs; this allows 
physicians to benefit from prescribing drugs optimally rather than from 
prescribing expensive drugs that do not add value. Producing and actively 
disseminating information about the clinical and economic value of drugs would 
be helpful for individuals who are working on negotiating with private 
manufacturers and payors. The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, 
created in 2010, was originally conceived to conduct this value-based research 
on drugs. However, the political process diverted it away from funding the kind 
of comparative effectiveness research that would help private payors make 
decisions in the pharmaceutical industry.39 Local interventions can include 
 
 37. See Karmen Hanson & Erik Bondurant, CANCER INSURANCE MANDATES AND EXCEPTIONS, 
(Nat’l Conf. of St. Legis. eds., 2009) (stating the states that have off-label drug use as a cancer-related 
benefit and offering). 
 38. See Juliette Cubanski & Tricia Neuman, Searching for Savings in Medicare Drug Price 
Negotiations, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 1, 3 (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-
searching-for-savings-in-medicare-drug-price-negotiations.  
 39. See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins 
and Prospect for Reform, 316 JAMA 858, 866 (2016) (stating that Congress precluded Patient-Centered 
Outcome Research Institute from considering drug prices, instead the Patient-Centered Outcome Research 
Institute focused on patient engagement and decision aids). 
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integrating value-based prescribing into physicians’ professional education, 
setting up electronic medical record point-of-care reminders,40 or enhanced 
institution-level decision-making. For example, Memorial Sloan Kettering 
Cancer Center determined that the drug ziv-aflibercept was not cost-effective and 
decided not to use it at its institution, resulting in the manufacturer giving the 
Center a particularly high discount on the product to keep it on the institution’s 
formulary.41  
B. Brand-to-Generic Transition 
The next period in the drug life cycle is the brand-to-generic transition 
period. The only type of competition that consistently and substantially lowers 
prescription drug prices comes from interchangeable generic drugs that emerge 
after the market exclusivity period ends. State drug product selection laws then 
facilitate the process of circulating generic drugs to patients by mandating or 
authorizing pharmacists to fill a prescription with a generic drug. This can occur 
even when a physician writes for a brand-name drug. Automatic substitution 
helps generic manufacturers compete based on price and ensures that prices reach 
closer to the cost of production. 
However, this brand-to-generic transition period can be delayed or 
prolonged. For example, the government provides an additional six months of 
exclusivity if a manufacturer tests its drug with children.42 This incentive derives 
its value from delaying generic entry. In addition, nearly all manufacturers seek, 
and the federal government grants, dozens of additional patents on their drugs 
during the course of development and the brand-name exclusivity period.43 
Generic manufacturers must then sue to invalidate these patents before bringing 
their drugs to market. Such secondary patents cover peripheral components of 
the drug as well as different compositions, formulations, polymorphs, and 
prodrugs, which have the potential to extend market exclusivity of these drugs 
by years.44 These patents also facilitate product hopping, in which the brand-
 
 40. Id. at 866–67. 
 41. See Peter B. Bach et al., In Cancer Care, Cost Matters, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/opinion/a-hospital-says-no-to-an-11000-a-month-cancer-
drug.html (explaining Sloan-Kettering’s decision to stop prescribing Zaltrap in favor for a less expensive 
and equally effective drug from the perspective of the prescribers); see also Ziv-Aflibercept, NAT’L 
CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/treatment/drugs/ziv-aflibercept (last updated Mar. 
9, 2018) (indicating that Zaltrap is the brand name for ziv-aflibercept).  
 42. Qualifying for Pediatric Exclusivity Under Section 505A of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act: Frequently Asked Questions on Pediatric Exclusivity (505A), FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm077915.htm (last updated Nov. 30, 2016).  
 43. Kerstin N. Vokinger et al., Strategies That Delay Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 177 JAMA  
INTERNAL MED. 1665, 1665–66 (2017). 
 44. Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case 
Study  
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name manufacturer markets additional products and “hops” their patients over to 
those products. For example, seven years after the FDA approved memantine in 
2003 for Alzheimer’s disease, it approved an extended-release version of 
memantine.45 Then, in 2015, Forest launched the extended-release once-a-day 
version to replace the original twice-a-day formulation, announcing also that it 
was going to remove the twice-a-day version from the market.46 If the removal 
occurred before the generic was introduced, it would have required every patient 
to switch over, undermining the market for the soon-to-be-introduced generic. 
This attempt at product hopping was blocked by a lawsuit from the New York 
Attorney General.47 Patent litigation can also lead to settlements in which the 
generic manufacturer agrees to drop the lawsuit in exchange for some valuable 
consideration from the brand-name manufacturer. While settlements can be 
efficient ways to end litigation, these settlements also prop up weak patents and 
delay generic entry. 
Other strategies intended to delay generic entry do not directly involve 
patents. For example, to garner FDA approval of its a generic drug, a 
manufacturer needs to conduct bioequivalent studies showing that its product is 
equivalent to the brand-name version. Yet there have reportedly been over 150 
cases in which brand-name manufacturers have refused to provide samples to 
generic manufacturers for such bioequivalence testing.48 Another delaying 
strategy including filing citizen petitions with the FDA.49 Most citizen petitions 
related to generic drugs are filed by brand-name manufacturers claiming that 
their product has a special characteristic, and thus, the generic should not be 
approved, which can have the effect of delaying entry of a generic.50 The 
manufacturer for the brand-name oral antibiotic Vancocin filed 24 different 
citizen petitions over a period of six years.51 
 
of How Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2286, 2291 (2012). 
 45. Vincent C. Capati & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Product Life-Cycle Management as 
Anticompetitive Behavior: The Case of Memantine, 22 J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 339, 
339–40 (2016). 
 46. Vincent C. Capati & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Drug Product Life-Cycle Management as 
Anticompetitive Behavior: The Case of Memantine, 22 J. MANAGED CARE & SPECIALTY PHARMACY 339, 
339–40 (2016). 
 47. State of New York v. Actavis, 787 F.3d 638, 663 (2015). 
 48. Kerstin N. Vokinger, et al., Strategies That Delay Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 177 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 1665, 1666 (2017). 
 49. See Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last Denied, 
66 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 305, 305–06 (2016) (analyzing 505(q) citizen petitions filed with FDA as a form 
of under-recognized anticompetitive behavior and concluding that 92% are filed by brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies with indicia of their purpose being to delay generic approval). 
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INTERNAL MED. 1665, 1667 (2017). 
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A possible solution that could help with cutting through the thicket of 
patents in an economically efficient way is re-examination of patents by the 
Patent Trial and Appeals Board, which was created in 2011 to administratively 
review patents that had been approved by the Patent and Trademark Office.52 
Others ideas include reconsideration of the appropriateness of brand to generic 
settlements and passage of CREATES Act, which would make it illegal for 
brand-name manufacturers to withhold samples for their products when generic 
manufacturers request them.53 
C. Multisource period 
The final period of a drug’s development course is the multi-source generic 
competition period. During this period, the price that a drug achieves is a function 
of the amount of competition that exists in the market; that is, simply because a 
drug is generic does not necessarily mean that it is inexpensive. The price of a 
generic drug depends on the number of competitors that can drive its price down. 
One study reviewed the average relative price per dose of a drug based on the 
number of manufacturers that were on the market and found that if there is only 
one generic manufacturer, the price of the generic version was 87% of the brand-
name version.54 With two generic manufacturers, the price of the generic was 
77% of the brand name’s price, three manufacturers, 60%, and starting when 
there are four or more manufacturers on the market, the relative prices of the 
generic to the brand-name were 50% or lower. 55 
However, some drugs may not have sufficient generic competition to keep 
the price down to what might be expected. Our 2016 review of a sample of drugs 
that had been approved in the past 25 years and lacked market exclusivity found 
that 15% of the drugs had no generic competitors and about a third of them had 
three or fewer generic competitors on the market, putting them at risk of 
 
Sham Petitioning to Delay Generics and Maintain its Monopoly over Vancocin HCL Capsules, FTC (Feb.  
7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/02/ftc-charges-shire-viropharma-inc- 
abused-government-processes (announcing the filing of a complaint against the manufacturer,  
alleging antitrust violations including abusing the citizen petition process in order to delay generic  
Vancocin entry to the market). 
 52. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., The Generic Drug Industry Embraces a Faster, Cheaper Pathway for  
Challenging Patents, APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y, Aug. 2018, at 1–2. 
 53. S. 974, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 54. Chintan V. Dave et al., Prices of Generic Drugs Associated with Numbers of Manufacturers,  
377 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2597, 2597–98 (2017). 
 55. Id. at 2597–98. (extrapolating from the data that with each additional manufacturer, the  
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shortages, high prices, and acquisition by pharmaceutical entrepreneurs.56 
Importation of generics from other well-regulated markets could be a possible 
intervention to respond to the lack of a vibrant generic drug market in these 
cases.57 In a sample of U.S. drugs that had insufficient competition, about two-
thirds of them were being produced by at least one other independent 
manufacturer in one or more foreign markets.58 Since there is ample evidence 
suggesting that drug supplies in other countries are safe, the FDA recently 
announced that it was forming a task force to examine this approach.59 
Ensuring effective generic competition requires sufficient funding of the 
FDA’s Office of Generic Drugs. The office was historically underfunded, 
leading to long delays in generic approval times until 2012, when Congress 
authorized manufacturer user fees to support generic drug applications. Since 
then, the FDA has approved new generics much more quickly and has been able 
to review the existing backlog of applications.60 Additionally, the FDA has 
recently announced that it will begin to expedite the review of generic 
applications to address a lack of effective competition.61 Greater funding can also 
support the science of generic drug production to ensure that even complex 
products have interchangeable versions available. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
One of the common misperceptions about the drug pricing controversies in 
the U.S. is that better pricing mechanisms will undercut innovation. As discussed 
previously, publicly funded research has helped produce many of our most 
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transformative new drugs, so as long as these funds are maintained, there will 
always be sufficient new targets and pathways for later-stage investment.  
Second, the recommendations listed above are intended to bring US drug prices 
in line with clinical value—that is, to rationalize payment for drugs in the US so 
that US patients stop paying exorbitant prices for drugs that offer minimal 
clinical impact. Paying for drugs based on their value may mean that there are 
some circumstances in which prices will be very high for drugs that offer 
substantial gains over existing treatments. But Medicare, Medicaid and other US 
payors will be able to better afford to cover such products for the patients who 
need them by not wasting vast sums on drugs that do not offer such advantages. 
By contrast, in the existing marketplace, incentives for innovation are misaligned 
with patient or public health goals because even marginally effective drugs or 
incremental improvements can generate substantial revenues. Finally, it is not 
clear that indefinite extension of market exclusivity incentivizes innovation. One 
study looking at the introduction of novel drugs by brand-name manufacturers 
found that the loss of market exclusivity protection was the most important 
predictor of the arrival of a new product.62 
Another common misperception is that solutions to address unreasonable 
prices are politically impossible. Recent surveys have found that three-quarters 
of Americans agree that drug costs are unreasonable.63 Prescription drugs are 
essential for medical care, can be transformative, and can also take substantial 
time and resources to develop. However, high drug prices create burdens for 
patients and the health care system. Addressing this issue will require fixing the 
lack of effective competition in the market due to market exclusivity and 
restrictions on payors that help maintain high prices that are not connected to the 
value of the products being sold. 
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